VZCZCXRO7532 OO RUEHCN RUEHGH DE RUEHIN #0759/01 1750800 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 240800Z JUN 09 FM AIT TAIPEI TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1813 INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 9262 RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL PRIORITY 0205 RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 0740 RUEHCN/AMCONSUL CHENGDU PRIORITY 3146 RUEHGZ/AMCONSUL GUANGZHOU PRIORITY 0294 RUEHHK/AMCONSUL HONG KONG PRIORITY 0688 RUEHGH/AMCONSUL SHANGHAI PRIORITY 2602 RUEHSH/AMCONSUL SHENYANG PRIORITY 7094 RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RUEHC/AIT WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY 0282 RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RHMFISS/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC PRIORITY RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC PRIORITY RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RHHMUNA/USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TAIPEI 000759

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EAP AND PM

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/24/2019

TAGS: PREL MARR TW

SUBJECT: PROPOSED DATES FOR TAIWAN POL/MIL TALKS

REF: A. TAIPEI 349

Classified By: AIT Director Stephen M. Young Reasons 1.4 (b/d)

11. (C) Summary. Taiwan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) inquired earlier this month about Washington's views on its proposal to hold U.S.-Taiwan political-military talks in Washington. MOFA offered August 31 - September 2 as its preferred window for the meeting. MOFA again stressed that the important goals for Taiwan in these talks are to learn how to structure its relatively weak interagency process and how to improve and strengthen Taiwan's civil-military relationship. End Summary.

IMPROVING INTERAGENCY COORDINATION

12. (C) MOFA Research and Planning Committee's National Defense and Security Unit Chief Paul Chen phoned Poloff June 4 to ask if the United States has views on MOFA's proposal to initiate annual political-military talks in Washington (ref A). MOFA's main goal for the talks, Chen reiterated, is to learn from the U.S. model as Taiwan looks to improve its own interagency coordination on security issues.

PROPOSED DATES

13. (C) Taiwan is flexible on the dates, Chen said. MOFA is now suggesting August 31 - September 2 as possible dates for the talks in Washington, followed by a visit to PACOM and the East-West Center by the delegation on their way back to Taiwan.

LOW PROFILE VISIT

14. (C) Chen stressed that, as previously stated by North American Division DG Harry Tseng, MOFA intends to keep the visit low profile as it does with the AIT/W-led visits and the Monterey Talks. The only support Taiwan would need is assistance in scheduling USG meetings. TECRO is prepared to handle all administrative and logistics issues and expenses for the delegation, according to Chen.

COMMENT

- ¶5. (C) These talks have the potential to strengthen our bilateral relationship with Taiwan and contribute to our overall objective of maintaining a peaceful and stable Asia-Pacific region. Security cooperation activities in support of our significant defense-related commitments under the Taiwan Relations Act have led to a robust U.S.-Taiwan military-to-military relationship. Such cooperation, however, has largely neglected the political and interagency component that buttresses this relationship. Taiwan's proposal provides an opportunity to address this by developing our association in a more strategic direction that includes, but is not dominated by, military issues.
- 16. (C) Giving Taiwan civilian and defense officials at working levels better access to more senior U.S. officials and letting them hear a broader range of U.S. voices is particularly important now, during a time of significant change in the U.S., Taiwan, and in cross-Strait relations. By providing a platform for greater political-military exchange and offering Taiwan one model for interagency coordination, the MOFA proposal would help advance Taiwan's fledgling efforts to improve policy coordination and would also enhance the role of Taiwan's civilian leadership in formulating national security policy. The proposed talks would also complement existing dialogues which predominantly focus on military issues and should strengthen the relatively weak political and interagency aspects of our bilateral

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relationship.